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Cultural Determinants of Workplace Arbitration
in the United States and Italy
Maurizio Del Conte*
Ann C. Hodgest
Although Italy and the United States are both advanced industrial economies, the law and
practice of workplace arbitration differs significantly in the two countries. This Article explores
those variations and analyzes the reasons lbr the divergent evolution of arbitration. The Article
concludes that histon'cal and cultural differences in legal systems and labor and employment
relations are explanatory forces. While the United States could provide a more balanced system of
arbitration by learning from the Italian systems greater protection of workers, given the current
reality neither system seems likely to undergo significant change in the near fiiture.
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INTRODUCTION

Globalization of employment is making knowledge of labor and
employment law of all nations an imperative. At the same time,
comparative legal studies can help nations learn from one another and
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improve on existing legal systems. As the United States Supreme Court
is hurtling U.S. employment law into private dispute resolution and the
Italian labor law system is under substantial pressure for reform as a
result of economic stresses, a comparative study of workplace arbitration
in the two countries is timely.
This Article looks at the law and impact of workplace arbitration in
the United States and Italy with a goal of analyzing the influences that
led to the current systems and determining whether the countries can
derive any useful lessons from one another. First, the Article looks
briefly at the labor and employment law systems in the two countries.
This analysis lays the backdrop for a discussion of the evolution and use
of arbitration in the two countries. The Article then moves to an analysis
of the similarities and differences between arbitration in Italy and the
United States and the reasons for those differences. Finally, the Article
focuses on lessons that can be drawn from the two systems.
The employment arbitration system in the United States is currently
weighted in favor of employers and could learn from the Italian
protection of workers. The Article suggests several modifications that
would provide better balance in the current system. But the Article
concludes that the historical and cultural forces that have shaped
arbitration in the two countries make it unlikely that either will change
significantly in the near future.
II.

LAW AND CONTRACT IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY

The legal systems governing the workplace in the United States and
Italy vary dramatically. These differences contribute to the differential
approach to arbitration in the two countries. This Part will briefly
explore the legal systems in order to assist in understanding the source of
the differences in the use of arbitration.
In the United States, statutes set minimum terms and conditions of
employment that can be expanded by labor unions negotiating with
employers; by individual employees negotiating with employers,
typically highly skilled, highly paid employees; or by employers acting
unilaterally. Statutes set a relatively low minimum wage; require
overtime pay at a higher rate for more than forty hours work per week;
prohibit child labor; prescribe standards for a safe and healthful
workplace; require unpaid leave for illness, childbirth, adoption, and care
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for an ill family member; and set certain standards for pensions and
health insurance voluntarily provided by employers. 1
The law provides benefits through mandatory insurance for workers
who are unemployed or injured on the job and requires contributions
from the employer and employee into a national retirement system. In
addition, the law prohibits discrimination based on race, religion,
national origin, gender, age, citizenship, genetic makeup, and disability.
The law also determines who is an employee and who is an independent
contractor not protected by employment laws. Most employees are at
will, meaning that they can be fired at any time for any reason.
Employees can negotiate contracts of employment that limit the
employer's authority to terminate them, but few have the power to do so
unless represented by a union.
For most employees in the United States, the employment laws and
terms set by their employer govern their work because only 7.5% of
employees in the private (nongovernmental) sector and 38.7% of
employees in the public (governmental) sector have union representation.2 The laws are normally enforced by filing a lawsuit in court, using
an attorney hired by the employee or by filing a claim with a government
agency with a duty to enforce the laws. Part II will explain how and
when arbitration can substitute for judicial enforcement.
Union-represented employees are governed by a negotiated
collective bargaining agreement, an enforceable contract including terms
and conditions of employment in addition to the minimums required by
law. 3 This contract applies only to the employees represented by the
union, however, so most employees are unaffected by these agreements.
A contract will typically provide wage rates far in excess of the minimum
wage; overtime premium pay in addition to what is required by law; and
pay for holidays, vacations, funeral leave, and sick leave. It may provide
1.
As of 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires employers with
fifty or more employees to provide health insurance for employees who work at least thirty hours
per week. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A), (c)(4)(A) (2012). The effective dates of the
insurance mandate have been postponed by regulation to 2015 and 2016, depending on employer
size. Press Release, Treasury and IRS Issue Final Regulations Implementing Employer Shared
Responsibility Under the AffiJrdable Care Act for 2015, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases!Pages/jl2290.aspx.
2.
Union Affiliation of Employed J.tage and Salary Workem by Occupation and
Industry, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.
t03.htm. For some explanations of the decline in union representation and, accordingly, power,
see JULruS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT 16--22 (20 IO);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of/ndustrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual
Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 575,
579-84 (1992).
3.
LAURAJ. COOPER ET AL.,ADRINTHEWORKPLACE 3 (3d ed. 2014).
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for certain benefits to be allocated by seniority, i.e., the length of time
employed by the employer. Such benefits might include layoff and recall
in times of reduced workload, promotions, and work assignments. A
union contract will almost always require just cause for discipline and
discharge, protection not normally available by law except for some
government employees. In some industries, such as construction,
mining, and longshoring, there is a history of multiple employers
negotiating one contract with a union. 4 In many cases, however, one
employer negotiates with one union and sometimes only one facility of
the employer negotiates with one union. Some contracts are negotiated
on a national or statewide basis with local supplements, but many are
exclusively local agreements.
As discussed further below, these contracts are typically enforced
using arbitration. In the United States, the law relating to unions and
collective bargaining and the protection of efforts to deal with the
employer collectively is known as labor law. The law relating to all
employees, union and nonunion, is known as employment law.
The Italian system operates quite differently, being more regulated
and affording more protections to the workers. Traditionally, the law
governs certain areas of employment and others have been covered by
collective agreements, generally negotiated on a much broader basis and
covering many more workers than in the United States. Among the
subjects traditionally regulated by law in Italy are many similar to the
United States, such as discrimination on grounds like marriage or
pregnancy, nature of the work relationship (employment or selfemployment), social security, health and safety in the workplace, and
protection for union activity. In contrast to American law, however,
Italian law provides protection against unjust dismissals. Contracts in
Italy cover subjects such as job duties, career development, special types
of pay under the contract, violations of the disciplinary code, the notice
period for termination of employment, and noncompetition covenants.
The two countries differ significantly in the form of unionization
and the coverage of collective bargaining agreements. In Italy, the
organization of workers has occurred, with some rare exceptions such as
managers and air traffic controllers, based on the type of employer for
which they work. As a result, trade unions operate in particular
industries or sectors. The collective contracts are typically nationwide
sector agreements containing the minimum economic and normative
4.
Comment, The Status of Mu!tiemployer Bargaining Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 1967 DUKEL.J. 558, 558-59 & n.3.
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terms of employment for all the workers in a certain productive sector
(the category), regardless of union membership. For some areas or
institutions of general interest, however, agreements may cover all
categories of workers (interconfederate agreements). This happened, for
example, for individual and collective dismissal; before the legislature
intervened to regulate the subject, the only regulation was contained in
interconfederate agreements. In some cases, collective bargaining
follows individual local and territorial contexts, with specific norms for
certain areas of the country (territorial agreements). It is the nationwide
sector collective contract that now represents the main instrument of
collective negotiation in the regulation of employment relationships and
that governs the various types of collective contracts and agreements in
ltaly. 5
The relationships between contractual sources and legal sources in
labor law are constructed hierarchically as in all of civil law, with the
legal source having automatic prevalence over the contractual source.
that the
This model is founded on a fundamental postulate:
heteronomous source (the law) has the imperative task of safeguarding
the fundamental rights-of freedom, dignity, and safety-of the
subordinate workers. 6 Consequently, every norm produced from a
contract-be it individual or collective-that lowers the system defined
by the heteronomous precept will be annulled and replaced by the
corresponding legal precept (in application of article 1418 of the civil
code). 7 The law is unbreakable; it cannot be modified or waived by the
contract.8
Until the 1970s, there were few situations where law and contract
overlapped. Accordingly, there was a mutual relationship of noninterference, and as a last resort in case of conflict, the law prevailed over the
contract, a criterion of unbreakability in peius.
At present, however, the overlap of autonomous (contractual) and
heteronomous (legal) sources is the norm in the regulation of labor law,
creating a situation of continual conflict, competition and, often,
integration between the various sources. In practice then, the relationship
5.
There are, however, some recent signs of change caused by the trend, common in all
industrialized countries, of decentralized negotiation. See Legge 14 Settembre 2011, n. 148 in
G.U. 16 settembre 2011, n. 216 art. 8. For an international overview of the phenomenon, see
ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., DECENTRALIZING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF LABOUR
UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES (2007).
6.
See RAFFAELE DE LUCA TAMAJO, LA NORMA INDEROGABILE NEL DIRITTO DEL LAVORO

(1976).
7.
8.

Art. 1418 Codice civile [C.c.J(lt.).
Id
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between autonomous and heteronomous sources is better explained in
terms of competing sources--even though they are hierarchically
ordered, they do not simply follow an abstract hierarchical criterion.
Today, contractual sources are sometimes involved in actual normative
procedures, as the presupposition for the law and as the content of the
law. In many cases, contractual sources deviate from legal sources (for
example in the case of a change of worker's duties); in others, laws are
integrated (as in the case of the proposal of staff leasing legitimated
during collective bargaining); in yet others, contractual agreements are
proposed as alternative sources to the law for the regulation of
employment relationships (illustrated by the case of the criteria of choice
of workers to be dismissed collectively). 9
In all these cases, the legislature realizes that collective bargaining
constitutes the most suitable instrument of social regulation and so does
not exercise its regulatory power. Theoretical debate on the topic has for
some time highlighted a progressive enrichment and diversification of
the functions of bargaining. In an evolving economic and social context,
bargaining has come to involve issues in which it does not perform its
traditional acquisitive function regarding wage increases and new
guarantees, but rather "administers" risks to which a group of workers
are exposed. With increasing frequency in the last few decades, often
thanks to specific legal delegation, collective bargaining has been
entrusted with the additional task of collaborating in the organization of
labor and in particular handling company crises and the ensuing
employment problems.
Having briefly reviewed the system of employment relations and the
legal background in each of the two countries, the stage is now set to
place arbitration in context as a part of the system in each country.
Ill. ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY

A.

Arbitration in the United States

1.

Labor Arbitration

While labor unions in the United States initially resisted arbitration,
a number of forces combined to encourage its acceptance and today it is
the most common method of resolving disputes over the meaning and
9.
According to Law No. 233/1991, in case of redundancy, the workers to be dismissed
must be selected on the basis of the criteria designed by an ad hoc collective agreement. If the
collective parties fail to reach an agreement, the criteria are automatically provided by the law as
follows: number of dependents of each worker, seniority, and organizational reasons. Legge 23
luglio 1991, n.223 in G.U. 27 luglio 1991, n.43.
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application of labor contracts. 10 Both governmental encouragement and
negotiation of arbitration agreements by unions and employers in major
manufacturing industries fueled the growth of labor arbitration prior to
World War II. 11 As aptly stated in 1940 by Walter Reuther, a leader of the
United Autoworkers Union:
You cannot strike General Motors plants on individual grievances. One
plant going down will affect the 60 other plants. You have to work out
something to handle individual grievances . . . . I don't want to tie up
90,000 workers because one worker was laid off for two months. That is a
c th
. 12
case 1or
e umprre.

During the war, the War Labor Board, created by the government to deal
with labor disputes that might interfere with production of goods needed
for the war, "encouraged and then required parties to include grievance
arbitration provisions" in collective bargaining agreements, and to accept
arbitration awards as binding. 13 Today, arbitration is included in virtually
all collective bargaining agreements.
In 1947, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act to encourage unions
and employers in the private sector to use alternative dispute resolution
methods to resolve disagreements over both contract negotiation and
contract interpretation. 14 Additionally, Congress made labor agreements
15
enforceable in the federal courts. These changes further cemented
arbitration as the method of choice for contract interpretation issues. As
for disputes over contract negotiation, mediation is, and has been, the
choice for resolving private sector disputes.
While refusing to enforce arbitration agreements in other contexts,
in the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court decided that
agreements to arbitrate disputes under collective bargaining agreements
were enforceable as a matter of national labor policy. 16 In a series of
cases collectively known as the Steelworkers Tniogy, the Court adopted
standards that were very deferential to arbitration, enforcing both
17
Because arbitration
agreements to arbitrate and arbitration awards.
I 0.
See generally Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The
Early ~aJ:Y, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373 (1983).
II. ldat417-20.
12. Id at419.
13. COOPER ET AL., supra note 3, at 10-12.
14. Id at 13; 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 201-203 (2012).
15. 29 u.s.c. § 185.
16. SeeTextile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-54 (1957).
See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
17.
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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provisions in labor agreements were the quid pro quo for agreements not
to strike, the Court concluded that the judicial hostility toward arbitration
18
agreements in other contexts was not appropriate. "[A]rbitration of
labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel
of the collective bargaining process itself." 19 Arbitration is the method of
peacefully filling contractual gaps and resolving the disputes about the
meaning of the contract, avoiding interruptions of production. 20
The Steelworkers Trilogy established that the courts should decide
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute but that absent
the clearest evidence of exclusion from arbitration, the courts should
order arbitration. 21 The Supreme Court cautioned the lower courts to
avoid entanglement in the merits of the claim in deciding whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate. 22 In the third Steelworkers Trilogy case, the
Court adopted the same deference upon judicial review of arbitration
awards. The courts should not review the merits of the arbitrator's
decision, but should enforce the decision so long as the award "draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement."23 Over time, another
narrow exception to enforcement evolved, denying enforcement to
arbitration awards that violate public policy. 24 Based on the Steelworkers
Tnlogy and its progeny, few arbitration decisions under labor agreements
Since
are appealed and fewer still overturned by the courts. 25
unionization in the private sector has decreased, however, there are fewer
labor arbitrations. 26
The parties to collective bargaining agreements determine the
arbitration procedure and it varies widely, although some generalizations
are possible. The procedure is not commonly specified in the
agreement.21 Many arbitration hearings follow a relatively formal,
judicial-like format using opening and closing arguments, direct and
cross-examination of witnesses, and in many cases, written posthearing
18.
Wamor& Gulf,363 U.S. at 578.
19. Id
20.
Id at 581.
Id at 582-83.
21.
22. Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568.
23. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
24. See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)
(recognizing the public policy exception to enforcement of arbitration awards, but refusing to
overturn an arbitration award that reinstated a truck driver who tested positive for illegal drugs on
public policy grounds).
See Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel Tums: New
25.
Evidence on the Finality ofLabor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. PoL'Y REV. 191, 204 (2007).
26. Id. at 194, 204.
27. The description of the labor arbitration procedure that follows is drawn from COOPER
ETAL., supra note 3, at 19-29.

2014]

WORKPLACEARBITRATIONINTHE US. &ITALY

45

briefs to the arbitrator. The rules of evidence that apply in court do not
formally apply in arbitration. Some parties choose more informal
procedures and may omit briefs, formal statements, and formal
examination of witnesses. Some unions and employers use attorneys in
arbitration, while others prefer to employ trained lay representatives.
Arbitrators are selected by the method negotiated by the parties.
Most agreements provide for one neutral arbitrator, but some use a
system of three, or occasionally five, arbitrators, one or two chosen by
each party and a neutral. Most agreements provide that an arbitrator is
chosen separately for each dispute, known as "ad hoc." Ad hoc
arbitrators are chosen by mutual agreement or using the services of an
impartial arbitration agency such as the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, a federal agency; the American Arbitration
Association, a private organization; or a state or local government
agency. When the parties receive a list of possible arbitrators from an
agency, the most common method of choosing from the list involves
alternately striking names until only one remains. Some parties select
one or a small group of arbitrators to serve as "permanent" arbitrator(s)
for all the disputes arising during the course of the contract. The use of
permanent arbitrators reduces delay and eliminates the need to educate
the arbitrator about the industry in each hearing.
The arbitrators that conduct labor arbitrations are not licensed or
regulated by the state. Many arbitrators are lawyers, while others are
academics or retired professionals, often from the field of labor relations
or human resources. Most arbitrate part-time, while some individuals
earn a living as arbitrators. Arbitrators are paid by the parties, with the
union and employer commonly dividing the cost of arbitration.
Arbitrators typically issue written decisions supported by reasoning,
days, weeks, or sometimes months after the hearing. 28 In some cases,
however, the parties request an immediate oral decision from the
arbitrator. There are several sources that publish the decisions of
arbitrators where the parties agree to publication. 29 There is no
systematic determination of which decisions are published, however,
because it depends exclusively on party agreement. Arbitration decisions
are not precedential in the American system, but the parties' expectations
and the system of arbitral selection have resulted in development of a
"common law" of arbitration that is followed by most arbitrators. 30
28.

The above mentioned description of the labor arbitration procedure can be found in
supm note 3, at 19-29.
Id at 1021-23.
Id at 285-88.

COOPER ET AL.,

29.
30.

46

TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 23

Arbitrators whose decisions are too far outside the mainstream of this
common law run risk being deemed unacceptable by parties choosing
arbitrators.
Unionization in the governmental sector in the United States
remains much higher than in the private sector. 31 Collective bargaining
law for government employees is established by individual states, with
only the law for federal employees promulgated by the federal
government. Arbitration has become a feature of this sector as well, both
for purposes of deciding issues of contract interpretation and for
determining what the collective bargaining agreement will be when the
parties cannot reach agreement in negotiations. The latter form of
arbitration, known as interest arbitration, is uncommon in the private
sector where strikes are allowed, but common in the public sector where
most jurisdictions prohibit strikes. 32 Arbitration of grievance disputes in
the public sector developed later and more slowly than in the private
sector. The major factor slowing development of arbitration in this sector
is concern about delegating the authority of the government to unelected
arbitrators. 33 Another factor is the many laws affecting the terms and
conditions of employment of government employees, which frequently
relate to or overlap with the provisions of collective bargaining
contracts. 34 These concerns initially caused courts to reject arbitration
altogether and even after arbitration was accepted, to limit the authority
of arbitrators by prohibiting arbitration of some disputes and refusing to
enforce arbitration awards in others. 35 While arbitration of public sector
contract disputes has become more widely accepted over time, courts in
public sector cases remain less deferential to arbitration. 36
All in all, arbitration as a method of settling labor contract
interpretation disputes has been relatively noncontroversial since the
mid-twentieth century in the private sector and in the last twenty years in
the public sector. Its success was a factor in the increasing consideration
of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes in the nonumon
workplace, commonly referred to as employment arbitration.

31.
See Union Affiliation of Employed IMige and Salary Worker.5 by Occupation and
Industry, supra note 2.
32. MARTIN H. MALIN ETAL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 611-12, 615 (2d ed. 2011).
33. Id at 677-78, 699.
34.
Id at 718-50.
35.
Id at 677-78, 718-50.
36. Id
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Employment Arbitration

The deference provided to labor arbitration agreements, particularly
in the private sector, was not applied to other arbitration agreements.
While arbitration substitutes for "industrial strife" in labor contracts, in
other cases it substitutes for litigation.37 Accordingly the courts initially
refused to enforce such agreements at all. 38 In 1925, Congress passed the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), making arbitration agreements enforceable.39 The statute contains language stating that "nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.'"'0 It also significantly limits judicial review of arbitration
decisions, allowing vacation of the award only on grounds of bias, fraud,
corruption, prejudicial arbitral misconduct, or where the arbitrators
41
exceeded their powers.
Despite passage of the FAA, the Supreme Court refused to enforce
agreements to arbitrate claims based on rights created by law, as opposed
to claims of breach of contract. 42 In the 1980s, however, the Court's view
of arbitration began to change and it began to enforce agreements to
arbitrate claims based on laws. 43 In the early 1990s, this trend moved into
employment law and the Court began to enforce agreements to arbitrate
claims under employment law statutes, beginning with the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act in Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane
Corp. 44 The Court concluded that an agreement to arbitration was merely
45
an agreement to a different forum, not a waiver of rights. Unless the
statute creating the claim barred arbitration, the Court would order
arbitration. The Court did not have to deal with the FAA's exclusion for
contracts of employment, however, because the arbitration provision in
Gilmerwas not contained in an employment agreement. 46

37.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
38.
See MALIN ET AL., supra note 32, at 728.
39.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1925).
40.
Id§ I.
41.
9U.S.C.§10(2012).
42.
See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953); COOPER ET AL., supra note 3,
at 739.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
43.
(1985); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989).
44.
500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
45.
Id at 29.
46.
Id at 25 n.2.
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Ten years later in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court was
47
faced with an arbitration agreement in an employment contract. The
Court read the exclusion for employment contracts very narrowly,
holding that it excluded only contracts of transportation workers like the
expressly mentioned "seamen" and "railroad employees," despite the fact
that the scope of interstate commerce is substantially broader today. 48
This decision opened the door to widespread adoption and enforcement
of arbitration agreements in employment.
Since that time, agreements to arbitrate employment law claims
have been enforceable, subject to certain limited defenses. One is that
the statute that gives rise to the dispute does not allow such agreements. 49
Because most employment statutes were passed before such agreements
were enforceable, however, they typically do not bar arbitration.50
Although the arbitration agreements are usually imposed on employees
as a condition of employment, courts have rejected the argument that the
employee's lack of bargaining power alone is a defense to enforcement. 51
Other defenses to arbitration are that there was no agreement to
arbitrate52 or that the employee cannot effectively vindicate the statutory
rights in arbitration. 53 In addition, the generally applicable defenses to
the enforcement of any contract apply. 54 In employment arbitration, the
company chooses the arbitration system. Some agreements limit
damages, shorten the statute of limitations for filing claims, require the
employee to pay part of the costs of arbitration, limit the ability to bring a
class action, permit the employer to choose the arbitrator, or limit
discovery of evidence in the possession of the other party. 55 There is
much litigation about the enforceability of agreements that use a process
that is not equivalent to that available in court. Some courts have refused
to enforce agreements with some or all of these provisions on grounds
47. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
48. !datll9,121.
49.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28.
50. An exception is the whistleblower protections under the Dodd-Frank Act, a financial
reform bill, which bars predispute agreements to arbitrate whistleblower claims. See Dodd-Frank
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(c)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)).
51.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
52. See, e.g., Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no
agreement to arbitrate the claims of an employee for sexual assault that occurred after work hours
in the employee's bedroom in employer-provided housing).
53.
See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000)
(recognizing the defense but finding that the plaintiff failed to establish it).
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements except "upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract").
55. MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1058, 1063-64 (2d ed.
2011).
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that the contract is unconscionable or that statutory rights cannot be
vindicated. 56 Other courts have ordered arbitration despite the differences
from litigation57 and still others have liberally construed or modified the
agreement to make it enforceable. 58 Where the provisions are weighted
too heavily in favor of the employer, however, courts that generally order
arbitration will allow the employee to bring the claim in court. 59
The Supreme Court has become very favorably inclined to
enforcing such agreements, despite efforts to resist arbitration by lawyers
representing employees. In recent years, the Court has decided many
cases involving arbitration agreements unilaterally imposed on
employees and consumers and most of the decisions favor arbitration. 60
The Federal Arbitration Act has been found to preempt many state laws
that limit enforcement of arbitration agreements,61 contrary to the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in other areas where the trend is to give
more power to the states. Efforts to enact a comprehensive federal
statute to prohibit imposition of such agreements on employees as a
condition of employment have been unsuccessful. 62 As a result of the
Supreme Court's decisions, the grounds for refusing to enforce
arbitration agreements are more limited, and the trend in the lower courts
is toward enforcement.
For many years, a 1974 Supreme Court decision appeared to
prohibit unions from agreeing with employers that employees would
have to arbitrate legal claims,63 but as the Court became more favorably
inclined toward arbitration a few lower courts enforced such
agreements. 64 In 2009, without reversing the 1974 decision, the Supreme
Court held that a union's agreement with an employer to arbitrate
disputes arising under discrimination laws barred an employee from
suing the employer in court for discrimination. 65 To be enforceable,
56.
Id at 1062, 1067-73.
57.
See id at I 063--64.
58.
Seeidat1060.
59.
See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e
hold that the promulgation of so many biased rules-especially the scheme whereby one party to
the proceeding so controls the arbitral panel-breaches the contract entered into by the parties.").
60.
See infra notes 90-91, 97 and accompanying text.
61.
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011 ).
62.
Jesse K. Kamens, Arbitration Faimess Act Reinforced To Curb Forced Arbitration !Or
Consumers, Others, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) (May 24, 2013), http://news.bna.com/clsn/
CLSNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=31079129&vname=clasnotallissues&fcn=53&wsh=5069540
OO&fu=3 l 079129&split=O (subscription required).
63.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974).
64.
See Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2001); Austin v. OwensBrockway Glass Container Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1996).
65.
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009).
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however, the agreement must clearly and unequivocally waive the
employee's right to litigate. 66 Additionally, the Court did not decide
whether the employee was bound by the arbitration agreement if the
union refused to arbitrate the employee's claim, which is commonly the
union's right under the collective bargaining agreement. 67
The Supreme Court has also held that employees who agree to
arbitration can still bring their cases to administrative enforcement
agencies, which may bring legal claims in court on the employee's behalf
despite the arbitration agreement. 68 The employee's arbitration agreement
does not bind the agency, which has a public interest to vindicate in
bringing the claim. 69 Government agencies bring suit only in a very
small number of cases, however. 10
Employment arbitration in the United States has been far more
controversial than labor arbitration. It is imposed on individual
employees without bargaining rights as a condition of employment using
a system designed by the employer alone. It removes their right to go to
court to vindicate legal rights. Critics of employment arbitration
complain that these agreements deprive unsuspecting employees of
important rights like a jury trial. 11 Additionally, courts have enforced
agreements that limit damages, shorten the statute of limitations for
bringing claims, and require the employees to pay costs that they would
not have to pay in court. 72 Critics argue that arbitration will limit public
exposure of discrimination, decreasing the deterrent effect of the laws
and allowing patterns of discrimination to continue. A related concern is
that development of the law may be suppressed, with fewer judicial
opinions interpreting statutes. Others are concerned that arbitration may
provide a kind of second class justice especially where there are power
66. Wright v. Universal Marine Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 79-80 ( 1998).
14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 249.
67.
68. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002).
69. Id at 295-96.
70. For example, in 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received
88,778 charges of discrimination and filed only 133 lawsuits for enforcement. Fiscal l'ear 2014:
Performance and Accountability Report, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTIJNITY COMMISSION 26, 27,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc.plan/upload/20 I 4par.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
71. Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread ofMandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for
the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 34-35 (2003).
72. See, e.g., Great W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1997)
(ordering arbitration, although the agreement reduced the statute of limitations and waived
punitive damages, and holding that whether the waivers were effective was for the arbitrator to
decide); Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1258-62 (I Ith Cir. 2003) (requiring
arbitration where the losing party was required to pay the fees of the other party and holding that
it did not prevent the plaintiff from vindicating his rights under the statute, although he would not
be required to pay the employer's fees in courts ifhe lost the case).
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differentials between the parties and no control over arbitrator quality. 73
A related concern is that, unlike labor arbitration, employers will be
"repeat players" in arbitration while employees will not.74 Thus
employers may be able to secure more favorable arbitrators because they
are more knowledgeable about their qualifications, and more favorable
decisions, because the arbitrator will want to ensure future business. 75
Proponents of arbitration, however, suggest that a quicker, cheaper
method of dispute resolution may benefit employees, particular those
with small claims that are unattractive to the plaintiffs' bar because of the
small legal fees generated. 76 While some employees may win large jury
verdicts in a litigation system, many others cannot get to court because of
the cost of litigation. Some argue that there is no real evidence of a
repeat player effect in arbitration and that indeed, employees win
arbitration cases on a regular basis. They argue that while employees
may trade off certain rights they gain benefits from agreeing to
arbitration and it should be permissible. In response to the complaint
that arbitration should be at the employee's option rather than imposed by
the employer, arbitration's fans assert that it is inefficient for an employer
to establish an arbitration system if it cannot insure that employees will
utilize it. Proponents also urge that there are many incentives for
complying with the law and the prospect of a large and public jury
verdict is only one; most employers will comply based on the risk of
arbitration claims, bad publicity and administrative enforcement, as well
as to improve employee morale and retention.
Finally, some
commentators have suggested that arbitration is less beneficial for
employers than may initially appear. 77
Empirical studies of arbitration show mixed results. It is difficult to
obtain data and difficult to determine how to make accurate comparisons

73.
This concern has abated in the courts but not among arbitration's critics. See Gilmer
v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (indicating that arbitration is merely a
different forum that does not entail relinquishing any substantive rights); Jean R. Stemlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. I 631, 1649-50 (2005); Jean R.
Stemlight, Disanning Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration
To Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter
Stemlight, Disanning Employees].
74. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. I, 11-17' 20 (2011 ).
75.
Id
76.
Samuel Estreicher, Satums for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001); Theodore
J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role ofLabor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 91 (2001 ).
77.
Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 421-40 (2000).
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of arbitration and litigation. 78 Some employees win arbitration cases,
although evidence indicates that employee victories are more common in
cases based on contracts than in cases involving legal claims. 79 Labor
arbitrators under union contracts rule for employees more often than
employment arbitrators. 80 There is some evidence that employees prevail
more often in arbitration than in court, although the validity and
significance of this evidence is much debated, 81 and recent research
suggests that the higher win rates are attributable to the inclusion of
individually negotiated agreements of highly compensated employees. 82
The evidence also indicates that employees receive greater monetary
damages in court than arbitration, but the studies do not consider cases
that settle prior to litigation, which may affect their validity. 83
Additionally, low-wage employees may have more opportunity to pursue
their claims in arbitration. 84 These studies have fueled, though not settled,
the debate about the use of employment arbitration.
Among the recent controversies is the enforcement of employment
arbitration agreements that limit class or collective claims, which involve
groups of employees or consumers joining together to sue their employer
or business. Such actions are available under most U.S. employment
laws. 85 They are particularly beneficial where each individual has small
damages because an individual lawsuit would require the employee to
spend more to litigate the case than is at stake. If many employees with
the same claim can join together, the cost of litigation is shared, the
process is more efficient, and the employer held to account. For the
employer, class actions can be expensive and time-consuming to
litigate. 86 They may attract media attention and adversely affect a
78. Stemlight, Disanning Employees, supra note 73, at 16.
79. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Satums and Rickshaws Revisited· W'lJat Kind of
Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 59, 64-65, 74
(2014); Douglas M. Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Adjudication of Workplace Disputes, in LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 361, 380 (Kenneth G. DauSchmidt et al. eds., 2009).
80. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 79, at 380, 387, 390.
81. id at 373.
82. See Colvin & Pike, supra note 79, at 74-76, 81 (showing that win rates and damage

awards are lower than those in litigated cases, particularly when the individually negotiated
agreements of high-level employees are separated from employer-mandated arbitration).
83. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 79, at 383-85.
84.
id at 385, 390. But see Colvin & Pike, supra note 79, at 81-82 (finding most cases in
arbitration will not be economically viable, leading to a system that is not accessible to
employees).
85. See Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7
Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 204-05 (2003).
86.
Deborah A. Sudbury et al., Keeping the Monster in the Closet: Av01ding
Employment Class Actions, 27 EMP. REL. L.J. 5, 20 (2000).
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company's reputation. 87 Accordingly, there is substantial pressure on
companies to settle such claims. 88 These pressures motivate businesses to
seek ways to avoid class actions. Arbitration agreements offer an
appealing vehicle to reach such a result, enhanced by recent decisions of
the Supreme Court. 89
In 2010, the Court ruled in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp. that a party could not be ordered to arbitrate class
claims unless the arbitration agreement specifically provided for class
arbitration. 90 Then in 2011, the Court held in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion that a state law that invalidated certain arbitration
agreements that precluded class claims was preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act and thus unenforceable. 91 These cases make arbitration
agreements that ban class actions enforceable, allowing employers to
escape class action claims. Critics argue that this allows employers to
avoid liability altogether because the cost will prevent many employees
from arbitrating individually.92
A more recent development may make this device less useful to
employers, however. In January 2012, the National Labor Relations
Board held that employers who promulgate arbitration agreements that
prohibit employees from filing class actions in both arbitration and court
violate the employees' right to engage in concerted activity, which is
protected by the National Labor Relations Act. 93 The court of appeals
denied enforcement of the decision, however, 94 and many other courts
have refused to follow the decision. 95
Nevertheless, the NLRB

87. Id at 21.
88. Id at 6, 22-23.
89. Because these cases were decided under the Federal Arbitration Act, which governs
arbitration of most employment law claims, they apply in employment cases. See Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. l 05 (2001) (applying the FAA to employment law claims).
90. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'! Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010). Where the
parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide whether a class action was permissible under a
contract that was silent on the issue, however, the Court followed its general policy of deference
and refused to set aside the arbitrator's interpretation that the agreement allowed class actions.
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013).
91.
131S.Ct.1740,1748(2011).
92. Sternlight, Disanning Employees, supra note 73.
93. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012). The statute does not cover
government employees, agricultural employees, employees of railroads and airlines, supervisors,
or managers. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3), (11) (2012); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace
Corp., 416 U.S. 267, 268-69 (1974).
94. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013)
(denying enforcement in relevant part).
95.
Id
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reaffirmed this interpretation of the statute in 2014 in Murphy 011,
indicating that the agency will continue to invalidate such agreements. 96
Most recently, a 2013 decision by the Supreme Court in an antitrust
case contributes further to the primacy of arbitration and its ability to
prevent class actions. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, the Court enforced a class action waiver in an arbitration
agreement between merchants. 97 The Court found that the law did not
ban class action waivers nor guarantee the right to bring a class claim,
even if an individual claim would cost more to litigate than was available
98
in damages. This case seems likely to encourage more employers to use
arbitration agreements to limit employee class actions and also casts
doubt on the viability of the defense to arbitration based on inability to
vindicate a statutory claim in arbitration.
B.

Italian Arbitration 99

In contrast to the United States, arbitration in the workplace in Italy
has been limited. Italy's civil law system is more protective of workers
than U.S. law, and that tradition is reflected in the judicial and legislative
treatment of arbitration. Much of the legal development relating to
arbitration has been statutory and only recently has arbitration similar to
that in the United States been permitted by law.
Arbitration in Italy was first recognized by the law in 1865. "About
conciliation and settlement" was the "preliminary title" of the Italian
code of civil procedure (C.p.c.) that recognized arbitration, allowing
litigants to opt for an alternative to state judicial power to resolve civil
disputes. 100 Article 20 sets forth that the "arbiters decide in conformity
with the rules of law where the settlement may not have authorized them
to reach such amicable compromise as might have been wished for." 101
Such wording drew a line between two types of arbitration that
remains today. Ritual arbitration must conform to the positive rules of
law, which determine the structure, proceedings, and outcome of the
process. In ritual arbitration, the award is vested with the same import as
any decision by a judicial body. In contrast is nonritual arbitration, where
96. Murphy Oil USA, 361 N.L.R.B. 72 (2014).
97.
133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
98.
Id at 2309.
99. The Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law would like to thank Sara
Lelli for her hard work and time spent during the substantiation of the Italian sources in this
Article.
I 00. 4 SALVAlDRE SATTA, COMMENTARIO AL CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVJLE pt. 2, at 162-63
(1971) (author's translation).
101. Art. 20 Codice di procedura civile [C.p.c.] (It.) (author's translation).
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the parties entrust a third party (a sole arbiter or board) to reach such
agreement as will resolve the controversy that arose between the parties.
Nonritual arbitration is far less constrained by law. The decisions and
processes in ritual arbitrations follow the C.p.c., whereas in the case of
nonritual arbitrations, also known as contractual arbitrations, it is up to
the arbiters to draw up the parameters of the arbitration, such as the
processes and rules of the forum. 102
Arbitration was first introduced in the legal system to resolve
employment disputes in 1893. 103 Act 15 vested the arbitration panel
committee with a judicial function in controversies with a ceiling of lire
200, in addition to the prevalent conciliatory function, but left the parties
free to grant the panel the flexibility of arbitration. 104 Despite this
development, for many years thereafter both the law and practice
hindered the use of arbitration in workplace disputes.
During much of the twentieth century, arbitrations arising from
individual contracts were permitted, but the law prohibited arbitration
provisions in collective agreements and arbitrations of individual
disputes arising from collective agreements. 105 Both legal restrictions on
individual arbitration 106 and suspicions of private justice and its protection
of workers limited the use of arbitration in the workplace. 101 But, as
procedure experts point out, some trade unions and employers began to
experiment with some forms of nonritual conciliation and arbitration by
including in collective contracts settlement clauses that were in
derogation of the strict rules of employment legal proceedings, leading to
legal reform in Act 532, enacted on November 8, 1973. 108
Although this law authorized nonritual arbitration where provided
by law or contract, it allowed the parties to go to court instead as long as
they did so within the terms provided by the contract. 109 The law also
authorized judicial review of the merits of the award for "breach of the
102. Luigi Biamonti, Arbitrato, in 2 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRIITO 899, 901 (Giuffre ed.,
1958).
103. CLAUDIO CECCHELLA, C ARBITRATO NELLE CONTROVERSIE DI LAVORO 35 ( 1990).
104. Id at 37.
105. Rosario Flammia, Arbitrato /IL Arbitrato e Conciliazione in Materia di Lavoro, in
ENCICLOPEDIAGIURIDICA 1, 1 (1999).
106. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1940, in its eighth title dedicated to arbitration
(articles 806ff-831), provided only for individual arbitration and expressly excluded its
application to industrial disputes of any kind and to social security issues. Carmine Punzi,
L'Arbitrato nelle Controversie di Lavoro, Rrv. ARB. 389, 389-90 (2001 ).
107. GIUSEPPE TARZIA, MANUALE DEL PROCESSO DEL LAVORO 56 (5th ed. 2008).
I 08. Carmine Punzi, L'Arbitrato in Materia di Lavoro: Fanti e lmpugnaziom; 5 MASS.
GIUR. LAV: 353, 354 (2010).
109. See TARZIA, supra note 107, at 57.
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110

law or the contracts or collective agreements." As a result of the broad
scope of judicial review, the parties rarely used arbitration but instead
went directly to court except in cases involving dismissals of top
111
managers.
The move toward true arbitration began at the end of the twentieth
century, with legislation that expanded the availability of arbitration
while still retaining for the parties the right to go to court on any claim.
In 1990, individual dismissals became subject to nonritual arbitration
after compulsory conciliation if both parties agreed. 112 The legislature
later broadened the controversies on which arbitration was permissible. 113
The new provisions, part of the C.p.c., 114 authorized nonritual arbitration
after mandatory conciliation 115 where provided by national contracts or
collective accords. In addition, the legislature abrogated the provision
from the 1973 law allowing broad judicial review. 116 Article 412 section
4 limited review to a single employment tribunal judge in the jurisdiction
where the controversy occurred. 111 The time limit filing the appeal was

110. Legge 11 agosto 1973, n. 533 in G.U. 13 Sept. 1973, n. 237 art. 5 § 2 (It.) (author's
translation).
111. Antonio Vallebona, Una Buona Svolta def Diritto def Lavoro: JI "Co/legato" 2010, 4
MASS. GIUR. LAV. 210, 211 (2010). One of the fathers of labor law called this law "the slaying of
arbitration," noting that the unions and their lawyers were indispensable in its passage but
effectively rendered arbitration a nullity by the limitations. See Gino Giugni, JI Dintto def Lavoro
negli Anni 80, 5 GIOR. DIR. LAV. REL. IND. 382, 400 (1982); Gino Giugni, lntervista, 411 RIV. IT.
DIR. LAV. 438 ( 1992) (author's translation). For further analysis of the restrictions of the law, see
Vallebona, supra, at 210, 214.
112. See Legge 11 maggio 1990, n. I 08 in G.U. 11 maggio 1990, n. I 08 art. 5 § 6 (It.).
113. See Art. 808(3) C.p.c. (It.), translated in SOMONA GROSS & MARIA c. PAGNI,
COMMENTARY ON THE ITALIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 73 (20 I 0) ("The parties may agree in
writing, that in lieu of the provisions of article 824-bis, the controversy may be decided by arbiters
by contractual determination. In all other cases, the provisions of the present title shall apply.").
114. See id. art. 412(3)-(4).
115. As in the case of arbitration for individual dismissals, arbitration must be preceded by
conciliation, a prerequisite to any legal action regarding employment. See Francesco P. Luiso, II
Tentativo Obbligatorio di Conci/iazione nelle Controversie di Lavoro, Riv. IT. DIR. LAV. 375
(1999); Bruno Capponi, Le Fonti degli Arbitrati in Materia di Lavoro, 5 MASS. G1uR. LAV. 357
(20 I 0). If conciliation fails, the parties decide (I) the method of initiating an arbitration request
and the period of time the other party has to agree; (2) the composition of the arbitration board
and the procedure for the appointment of the president and members; (3) the forms and methods
of any investigation; (4) the deadline for the award and notification to the parties; and (5) the
arbitrators' pay. The nonritual arbitral procedure remains an alternative form of resolution as the
parties are at all times free to opt for court action or to request the arbitral board of right or any
other form of arbitration expressly provided at law (e.g., the one previously mentioned for
individual dismissals). Id. at 358.
116. See Decreto legislativo 31 marzo 1998, n. 80, in G.U. 8 aprile 1998, n. 65 (It.).
117. Art. 412(4) C.p.c. (It.).
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thirty days from notification of the award and the judge's decision was
final. 118
The judge could set aside the award:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

If the arbitration agreement was invalid or the arbiters
exceeded their authority and the exception was raised in the
arbitral proceedings;
If the arbiters were not appointed as required by the arbitration
agreement;
If the award was rendered by an ineligible arbiter as defined in
article 812;
If the arbiters did not stay within the conditions set by the
parties for the award to be valid;
If the arbitral proceedings did not allow both parties the
opportunity to present their case and to reply to the opponent's
case, an essential principle in the Italian legal system that we
have translated as confrontation. 119

The arbitral award is expressly defined as a "contractual award," so it
cannot be overturned for breach of the rules of law and collective rules
pertaining to the merits of the controversy, but solely for the reasons set
forth above. Thus, the review is more similar to that in the United States
with the exception of confrontation, which is not required in U.S.
arbitration.
Despite legislative changes that allow more arbitration,
controversies may be decided by arbiters only where the law or the
collective contracts and accords provide for it. Also, unlike the United
States, the parties always remain free to reject arbitration for any
particular dispute and go to court, despite a contractual or legal provision
providing for arbitration. Even after the law changed, legal scholarship
heavily slanted in favor of workers argued that controversy over the
"validity of the award" still referred to the violation of rules at law
pertaining to the merits of the controversy. 12° Collective agreements lost
no time insuring that awards could still be challenged on the merits in
court, thus depriving the legislation of the intended arbitral finality. 121
118. /dart.412.
119. Id (author's translation).
120. See Decreto legislativo 29 ottobre 1998, n. 387, in G.U. 7 novembre 1998, n. 261 (It.)
(author's translation); Vallebona, supra note 111, at 210. The serious limitations to the arbitral
institution were also stressed by Giuseppe Tarzia, who noted that the award was less binding than
the statement of the minutes of conciliation drawn up at the office of the union or in front of the
commission. See TARZIA, supra note I 07, at 69.
121. See Vallebona, supra note 111, at 211.
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The latest development in Italian arbitration occurred in 2010, in the
"employment reform package." 122 This law provided for true arbitration,
enabling the parties to choose between public and private avenues of
remedy for controversies that have arisen and that may arise in the future.
Nonritual arbitration is allowed, on the basis of collective accord
provisions agreed to by the more representative trade associations and
certified by the commissions set up by the Provincial Employment
Bureau. Arbitration may proceed in front of arbitral chambers instituted
by certification bodies 123 or, last but not least, in front of a board set up at
the instigation of the parties to the controversy.
In contrast to U.S. arbitration, the statute contains more detailed
prescriptions regarding the arbitration procedure, which in the United
States is left to the parties. The previous text of article 412 section 4
C.p.c., was replaced by the wording: "without prejudice to the right of
each of the respective parties to take legal action and to resort to the
conciliation and arbitration procedure provided at law, the controversies
listed under article 409 may also be submitted to the nonritual
conciliation and arbitration board instituted in the following terms,"
124
which state procedural rules. The petitioner must reference the points
of law in support of the claim and may also include a request to decide ex
aequo et bona, which means in respect to the general principles of the
legal system and the regulatory principles regarding the subject matter,
also deriving from EU law. 125
If the respondent accepts the conciliation and arbitration procedure,
it appoints its own arbiter, who has thirty days from notification of the
appointment to select, with the other arbiter, the president (a neutral
arbiter) and the place for the meeting of the board. If the arbiters do not
agree, the petitioner may request the president of the court of the district

122. Legge 13agosto2010,n.151,inG.U. 11 settembre2010,n.215(1t.).
123. The Biagi reform (Legge 14 febbraio 2003, n. 30, in G.U. 26 febbraio 2003, n. 47
(It.), and Decreto legislativo 10 settembre 2003, n. 276, in G.U. 9 ottobre 2003, n. 159 (It.)),
introduced certification bodies into the legal system to reduce legal disputes under collective
agreements regarding the status of workers as employees or independent contractors. The
purpose of certification is to assure the free will of the parties in signing the contract. The
certification procedure, supervised by an appointed commission, starts with agreement of both
parties and must contain the specifications of the contract for which certification is requested.
The procedure ends by an ordinance of either certification or rejection, determining whether the
contract is for employment or independent contractor status. A positive certification makes it
impossible to question the determination of worker status absent a legal decision on the issue.
124. Art. 412(4) C.p.c. (It.) (author's translation).
125. Id§ 2.
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to appoint the neutral arbiter. The controversy is decided within twenty
days of the hearing by the issuance of an award. 126
The award of the arbiters, duly authenticated, carries "the force of
law on the parties," the same as article 13 72 of the civil code dealing
with contracts. 121 Controversies about the validity of the nonritual arbitral
award, which may be challenged within thirty days of notification, are
decided by review of the court with first-level jurisdiction. Once the
deadline for appeal has expired, if the parties have declared in writing
that they accept the decision or, if the challenge is rejected by the
tribunal, the judge, upon request of the parties and having verified the
procedural propriety of the award, declares it valid and enforceable. 128
The noteworthy change allows the parties that opt for nonritual
arbitration to agree that the award may not be challenged in front of a
judge for violation of collective contracts and accords and rules of law
pertaining to the merit of the controversy, as is permitted in ritual forms
of arbitration. 129 Thus, employment disputes resolved by contractual
arbitration are subject to challenge, as in article 808 section 3 C.p.c., only
where the arbitral convention is invalid, the arbiters overstepped the
limits of the mandate, the appointment of arbiters was not in
conformance with convention, the arbiters had legal incapacity, the
arbiters violated the rules set down by the parties, or the requirement of
confrontation is violated. Such requirements are essentially procedural
and do not bear on the merits, similar to the United States. With this
limitation on the scope of review, however, came a prohibition on
arbitrating dismissal cases.
Under the 2010 reform, parties to an individual employment
contract are also allowed (under section 8 article 31, Act 183 of 2010) to
agree to nonritual arbitration for any controversy that may arise from the
contract, precluding in advance any recourse to legal action. 130 Such a
clause is enforceable only if "certified," in order to ensure "the effective
will of the parties to assign to arbiters any such controversy as may arise
from the employment contract." 131 Such a covenant reproduces the

126. Id§ 10.
127. See id Article 1372 C.c. provides: "The contract has the force of law between the
parties. It can be solved only by mutual consent or according to reasons allowed by law. The
contract has no effect with respect to third parties." Art. 1372 C.c. (It.) (author's translation).
128. Art. 412(4) § 10 C.p.c. (It.).
129. Antonio Vallebona, L'Arbitrato lnitua/e nel Sistema de/ Diritto de/ Lavoro Dopa ii
"Co/legato, "5 MASS. GIUR. LAV. 362, 363 (2010).
130. Art. 412(4) § I 0 C.p.c. (It.).
131. For the certification procedure, see sources cited supra note 123.
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aspects of arbitration set forth in article 808, section 1 C.p.c., which may
be included in the contract or in a separate document.
Doubts about the constitutionality of the form of the arbitration
clause seem groundless. Some critics have argued that the new
procedure would clash with article 101 of the Constitution providing "no
special judges may be instituted," and with article 24, which guarantees
free access to a judge for the protection of one's rights. 132
In no way, however, does the new legal procedure impinge on the
parties' right to call upon the judicial authority and to resort to the range
of conciliation and arbitration procedures provided by law. Any party to
the employment contract may refuse to agree to an arbitration procedure
suggested by the other party, because arbitration remains, in every form,
an option for the parties and not mandated by law. 133
Under labor law, article 412 section 4 regulates invalidation of
nonritual arbitration as follows: "Controversies regarding the validity of
the non-ritual arbitral award pursuant to article 808 section 3 C.p.c., are
decided by a single employment judge." 134 Such wording caused some
concern that use of the term "validity" might authorize judicial review of
the merits of the controversy. Yet, such position is untenable because the
term "validity" is simply meant to connect nonritual arbitration with the
model of invalidation, which is exclusively procedural. 135 And in any
event, invalidation of an arbitral award is lawful where it violates
inalienable provisions at law and in collective accords. 136
Lastly, the new article 412 section 4 C.p.c. enables the parties to ask
arbiters to decide ex aequo et bono. 131 Because, according to the same
provision, a decision ex aequo et bona must be handed down "with
respect to the general principles of the legal system and the regulatory
principles of the subject matter, such as flow from EU law," court
practice has found that "there does not seem to exist a big difference,

132. Article 24 of the Italian Constitution provides, "Everyone can take legal action to
protect their rights and legitimate interests." Art. 24 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (author's
translation).
133. On that issue and on good practice in the use of nonritual arbitration, see Vallebona,
supra note 111, at 216. Cf Capponi, supra note 115, at 357.
134. Art. 412 C.p.c. (It.) (author's translation).
135. For a brief compilation of the issues raised by the new nonritual arbitration system,
see Capponi, supra note 115, at 361.
136. For example, provisions regarding health and safety, the right to organize, a decent
salary, and all the rights directly or indirectly protected by the Constitution. See Eduardo Ghera
& Lucia Valente, Un Primo Commentoa/ CoflegatoLavoro, 12 MASS. GIUR. LAV. 869 (2010).
137. This concept is similar to equity in the American legal system.
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considering the transactional nature of non-ritual awards, between award
at law and award ex aequo et bono." 138
In summary, arbitration that is more final and binding is now
possible under Italian law, with judicial review for procedural defects in
the decision. However, the parties always remain free to avoid arbitration
and resort to the courts for enforcement of either contractual or legal
rights.
Having reviewed the law and practice of workplace arbitration
under the U.S. and Italian systems, it is now possible to consider the
similarities and differences between the systems.
IV.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

A.

Companson Between the Two Systems

The foregoing discussion of arbitration in the labor and employment
sector in Italy and the United States reveals a few similarities, but far
more differences between the two countries. This Part will first discuss
the similarities and then the differences, reflecting on the reasons for the
differences. It is clear that each system has evolved in its own way based
on the unique nature of the legal system and the culture of the workplace.
Laws in both Italy and the United States authorized arbitration long
before it developed as a practice in the employment field. In both
countries, there has been resistance to arbitration in the labor and
employment law arena, although arbitration is far more widely accepted
today in the United States than in Italy. And arbitration is a voluntary
process in both countries, although employees in the United States may
have no real voice in whether to arbitrate employment claims. In both
countries, arbitration is quicker than litigation in most cases, but that has
not convinced most parties with a choice, outside of the collective
bargaining context in the United States and highly paid employees in
both countries, to adopt arbitration to resolve most disputes. Judicial
review is limited to procedural violations rather than the merits in both
countries, with the exception of ritual arbitration in Italy. Finally, in both
countries, there are legal limitations on arbitrating certain types of
claims.
Far more significant than the similarities are the differences
between the two countries. Some of these differences are rooted in the
differing legal traditions, with the United States being a common law
country and Italy a civil law country. Thus most, though certainly not all,
138. Ghera & Valente, supra note 136, at 869 (author's translation).
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of the development in U.S. arbitration has been in collective bargaining
and the courts, while in Italy it is in legislative enactments. Additionally,
Italy has a much stronger tradition of protecting workers' rights in both
the courts and the legislature. This tradition and the political force that
keeps it in place have resisted the spread of arbitration, because the
courts are viewed as protectors of workers' rights.
One major difference is that arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements, known as labor arbitration, has, for over half a century, been
widely accepted in the United States to resolve disputes between unions
and employers about the meaning and application of the agreement.
Both labor and management have accepted this system as an effective
substitute for both economic action, such as the strike, and judicial
enforcement. It is used almost exclusively to enforce collective
bargaining agreements.
No similar acceptance of arbitration is evident in Italy. This may
reflect in part the different labor relations systems in the two countries,
139
with the United States more clearly separating contract and law. The
U.S. labor arbitration system evolved at a time when there were few legal
rights for employees. Almost all rights came from the negotiated
agreement. Further, in the United States just cause protection from
termination remains a contractual protection, commonly available in the
private sector almost exclusively to employees covered by a union
contract, 140 while in Italy such protection exists by law. A related
explanation is the focus of U.S. unions on what has been called
"industrial unionism" or "bread and butter" unionism. 141 While there has
almost always been a more radical element in the American labor
movement, over time it has diminished in size and the philosophy of
142
business unionism prevailed.
The focus of most unions has been to
negotiate and enforce favorable terms and conditions of employment
with their employer, with the primary enforcement mechanism being the
143
grievance and arbitration procedure.
Under the Italian legal system, there is no distinction between rights
based on the law and rights based on the contract because according to
139. For an analysis of the detrimental effects of this separation for employees, see
generally Stone, supra note 2.
140. The exception is the state of Montana, which has a statute requiring just cause for
termination. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 39-2-904 (2013).
141. KENNETH DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 34,
84 (2014).
142. Id at 34-38, 71-74, 83-85.
143. Id at 84. For a criticism of labor arbitration as detrimental to employee rights, see
Stone, supra note 2, at 629-3 I .
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article 1372 of the civil code, "the contract has the force of law between
the parties." 144 Instead, there is distinction between laws governing
contracts, which may provide for mandatory or nonmandatory rules.
Provisions of labor law are in most cases mandatory. The exemption
from mandatory rules is generally permitted only if it benefits the
employee. Some rules allow limited flexibility, those related to working
hours for example, but the general rules (vacation, illness, pregnancy,
birth of a child, rest, right to strike, and especially those related to the
termination of the employment relationship) are mandatory. 145
Indeed, the mandatory nature of the right to strike in Italy illustrates
another significant difference between the two systems. In Italy, any
limitation on the right to strike arising from an arbitration agreement
might violate the Italian law barring "anti-union activity" by the
employer. In such cases, the union is entitled to bring a claim before the
tribunal, composed of one judge, in order to have the union-busting
ceased and the status quo restored. 146 The court injunction has indirect
impact on the individual workers' positions (for instance, reinstatement
to their jobs if the antiunion conduct of the company resulted in
dismissal). The court injunction, which is issued at the end of a quick
procedure, may be contested by the employer before the tribunal. 147
While the United States also prohibits discrimination based on union
activity as well as other interference with such rights, 148 limits on striking
based on arbitration agreements are not considered violations of the law.
In fact, the Supreme Court has held that a contract that provides for
arbitration of disputes implicitly includes a prohibition on the right to
strike, even if the parties did not negotiate any such limits, and despite
the express legal protection for the right to strike. 149
Because the Italian system does not utilize what is known in the
United States as labor arbitration, the comparison between the two
systems is meaningful only in relation to employment arbitration, which
for both jurisdictions has as its object workers' rights provided by law or
contract.

144. Art. 1372 C.c. (It.) (author's translation).
145. See Decreto Legislativo 8 aprile 2003, n. 66, in G.U. 14 aprile 2003, n. 87 (It.);
Decreto Legislativo 26 marzo 2001, n. 151, in G.U. 26 aprile 2001, n. 96 (It.); art. 40 Cost. (It.);
Legge 15 luglio 1966, n. 604, in G.U. 6 agosto 1966, n. 195 (It.); Legge 20 maggio 1970, n. 300,
in G.U. 27 maggio 1970, n. 131 (It.).
146. See L. n. 30011970 art. 28, § I.
147. Id art. 28, § 3.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l), (3) (2012).
149. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962).
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Arbitration of legal disputes 150 between individual employees and
employers is still resisted by many in the United States. Most academic
commentators have been critical of the judicial trend toward enforcement
of unilaterally imposed arbitration agreements. 151
Similarly, when
expressly questioned about arbitration, most employees support it only
where the system is fair and the majority of them oppose mandatory
arbitration of legal claims as a condition of employment. 152 Courts,
however, have widely accepted and enforced "agreements" to arbitrate all
disputes related to employment imposed unilaterally by employers on
individual employees without bargaining power.
The explanation for the different approach to employment
arbitration in Italy and the United States is rooted largely in differences in
the judicial systems. While the courts in Italy actively protect the rights
of workers, the courts in the United States, in particular the Supreme
Court, which has driven much of the move toward arbitration, are far
more inclined to support business. 153 A recent empirical analysis of
judicial decisions in the Supreme Court from 1946-2011 concluded that
in the 1960s there was a decline in the Court's support of business
interests, but the probusiness inclination began to increase with the
154
Burger Court in 1969. While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts ( 19692004) were favorable to business, the Roberts Court, which began in
2005, has exceeded the two previous Courts in its probusiness
orientation. 155 Indeed, five of the ten Justices most favorable to business
in the time period of the study are current members of the Roberts
Court. 156 The study also demonstrated that justices appointed by
Democratic presidents, who would generally be expected to be less

150. As distinguished from contractual disputes.
151. Jean Sternlight, Is the US. Out on a Limb? Comparing the US. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That ofthe Rest ofthe World, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 831, 837-39 (2002); Matthew W. Finkin, Privatization ofWrongfiJJ Dismissal Protection
in Comparative Perspective, 37 INDUS. L.J. 149, 166-67 (2008).
152. Finkin, supra note 151, at 166.
153. See Etwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court atAge Three, 54 WAYNEL. REV. 947, 962
(2008) (calling the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Roberts the most probusiness court
since the 1930s); Sternlight, supra note 151, at 855-56 (suggesting corporate influence as an
explanation for the differing acceptance of arbitration in the United States and most other
countries); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to
Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 983, 1008 (2008) (acknowledging the Court as probusiness in
certain respects but suggesting it is not extremely so).
154. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1472 (2013).
155. Id
156. Id
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favorable to business, have, over time, become more supportive of
business interests. 157
A subsequent analysis of the 2011-12 term of the Court concluded
that the decisions of that term, including both consumer 158 and
employment cases, favored business even more clearly than decisions in
earlier terms of the Roberts Court. 159 Consistent with the earlier study,
analysis of the 2011-12 term showed that even liberal leaning justices
ruled with business in a number of cases where there was a reasonable
argument on the other side of the case. 160
In addition to probusiness leanings, an alternative, or perhaps
complementary, explanation of the Roberts Court's rulings from a more
conservative commentator is the Court's view that litigation, and
particularly complex litigation, is not an effective method of resolving
disputes. 161 A somewhat similar explanation is offered by Professor
Matthew Bodie, who suggests that the Roberts Court supports private
enforcement of law, including compliance efforts by employers' human
resources departments, in lieu of litigation. 162 While Professor Bodie
does not focus on arbitration, deferring disputes to arbitration is
consistent with a focus on shifting from litigation to employer
enforcement of legal norms.
A third plausible explanation for the Supreme Court's infatuation
with arbitration is that the Court is simply clearing its docket of cases by
enforcing agreements for private justice. 163 Professor Finkin argues that
this is the most persuasive explanation of the shift in the Court's view of
arbitration because the corporate influence on the Court is, at best,

157. Id at 1472-73.
158. Several of the cases that impact employment arbitration were consumer cases
applicable to employment law because both arise under the FAA. See supm text accompanying
note 89.
159. Corey Ciochetti, The Constitution, the Roberts Court, and Business: The Significant
Business Impact ofthe 2011-2012 Supreme Court Tenn, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 385, 41936, 444, 460-63 (2013) (analyzing the 2011-12 term of the Court and concluding that while prior
Roberts Court terms were not uniformly probusiness, the term analyzed was quite clearly
probusiness). The author also found that the Court both narrowed and expanded statutes and
constitutional provisions to reach the decisions favorable to business. Id at 461.
160. Id at 460-61.
161. See Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court at Age Three: A Response, 54 WAYNE L.
REV. 1015, 1025 (2008) (acknowledging the Court's probusiness bent but suggesting that a more
persuasive explanation for the Court's decision is its skepticism about the value oflitigation).
162. Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, 34
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 159, 161-62 (2013).
163. Finkin, supm note 151, at 167 (quoting IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW
172 (1992)).
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164

indirect.
Further, the judicial shift to enforcement of arbitration
agreements coincides with the expansion of judicial claims available to
employees, making reducing the docket more attractive. 165
Each of these rationales has some force as an explanation for the
extraordinary acceptance of employment arbitration by the Supreme
Court, which has driven acceptance by other courts. Depending on the
particular case, the lineup of justices favoring arbitration may vary, based
166
The
on the views of the justices and the countervailing arguments.
combination of probusiness orientation and the appeal of alternatives to
litigation has led to law that permits employers to force employees into
arbitration for both contractual and legal rights, and to restrict their
ability to bring claims on a class basis. Further, the fact that the
opponents of arbitration have not been able to obtain legislative reversal
of the Court decisions suggests that the power of business and the
weakness of the employee/consumer lobby have an influence on the
acceptance of employment arbitration. The failure legislative efforts may
also reflect a lack of widespread knowledge or active concern about the
impact of arbitration on employees and consumers. 167 The lack of class
consciousness in the United States and the reduced influence of labor
unions exacerbates this absence of focus on the loss of rights.
In contrast to the United States, Italian law secures the right of each
party to bring a claim before the judicial authority, whether asserting a
violation of law or contract, and to use the different procedures of
conciliation and arbitration provided by law. Each party can always
reject a proposal for arbitration advanced by the other party, because
arbitration, in all forms, is a free choice of the parties, not imposed by
law. For this reason, the agreement to arbitrate must be expressed by the
164. Id at 165. Professor Finkin also argues that the votes of individual justices on
arbitration cases do not always track the political views of the appointing president, which is
consistent with the findings of scholars analyzing the business orientation of the Supreme Court.
Id Perhaps, however, that fact does not completely denigrate business orientation as an
explanation for the Court's decisions but instead shows the pervasiveness of business influence,
particularly when combined with the interest in reducing court dockets.
165. Id at 168.
166. For example, the more recent cases restricting class actions and allowing unions to
waive employee rights to litigate are largely 5-4 or 5-3 (Justice Sotomayor recused herself in two
of the cases), with the conservatives in the majority and the more liberal or moderate justices in
dissent. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt Nielsen S.A. v.
Anima!Feeds Int'! Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (20 IO); Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct.
2304 (2013); 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
167. Several nonprofit organizations have recently launched an effort to educate
consumers and employees about the impact of arbitration agreements that are often ignored or
hidden from those affected. See Lost in the Fine Print, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (2014),
http://www.afj.org/multimedia/first-Monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print.
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employee in relation to each dispute and arbitration clauses are not
allowed in employment contracts as in the United States.
The exception in Italy is the recent Act 183 of 2010, which allows
nonritual arbitration, 168 similar to employment arbitration in the United
States, in limited circumstances. Under this new law, the following
rigorous conditions must be met:
(1)

(2)

(3)

the arbitration clauses must have been established by cross-sector
agreements or collective bargaining agreements signed by the most
representative organizations of employers and employees at national
level;
the certification bodies before which the arbitration clauses have to
be signed must have verified the actual intent of the parties and the
clause can't be signed before the expiration of any probationary
period or, if none, at least 30 days after the beginning of the
employment contract; and
disputes relating to dismissal cannot be subject to arbitration
169
clauses.

In contrast to the American system, even this limited Italian
exception for contractual arbitration agreements seems designed to
protect vulnerable employees and insure that arbitration agreements are
truly voluntary. Only labor unions, with more power than individual
employees, can enter into such agreements. Moreover, arbitration of
claims relating to dismissal is not allowed, thereby preventing employees
from sacrificing or limiting their most important legal protections. In the
American system, unions can also waive employee rights to litigate,
including legal claims relating to termination, but the most vulnerable
employees are those without unions and they have no protections from
compelled arbitration.
Despite the limited acceptance of arbitration enacted in 2010, the
Italian labor market reform of 2012 does not contain any reference to
arbitration, showing a disregard for this institution. 110 The brief
experience of the 2012 Reform confirmed the existence of an extreme
resistance in Italy towards forms of private jurisdiction, resulting from a
"statist culture" grown mainly by the CGIL (left-leaning trade union) and

168. Nonritual arbitration need not provide precisely the same procedures as the courts,
and there is more flexibility in applying the law. Comparatively, this is similar to arbitration of
legal claims in the United States.
169. See Legge 4 novembre 2010, n. 183, in G.U. 9 novembre 2011, n. 262, art. 31, § 10
(It.) (author's translation).
170. See Legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92, in G.U. 3 luglio 2012, n. 153 (It.).
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the expectation created by judges convinced that they must protect
employees. 111
What most distinguishes employment arbitration in the United
States from arbitration in Italy is the ability of U.S. employers not only to
require the worker to agree to arbitration, but also to condition
employment on the signing of clauses that limit rights provided by law,
such as caps on damages, reduction of limitation periods, or limits on
available discovery. These clauses would be absolutely void in the Italian
legal system and might also constitute the crime of extortion, as defined
by article 629 of the penal code: "Whoever, by violence or threats,
forcing another person to do or omit anything, procures for himself or
others an unjust profit and a detriment of others shall be punished with
imprisonment between one and five years." 112
The problem of arbitration clauses that limit class actions, which
carries great importance in the United States, is entirely absent from
Italian labor law. In Italy, the class action, which was introduced in 2007
by Act 244, is available to consumers or users who suffer damages from
signing form contracts, pursuant to article 1342 of the civil code, or as a
result of noncontractual torts, unfair trade practices, or anticompetitive
113
trade behavior. It does not apply to the employment contract.
In addition, article 103 of the C.p.c. of 1942, provides, "More
parties can act or be sued in the same process, when a connection exists
between the causes that are presented in terms of the object or the title on
which they depend, or when the decision depends partially or entirely, on
the resolution of the same issues." Based on this rule, there are cases in
which a large number of petitions are filed in a single case. With one
judicial claim, a number of employees of the same employer may bring a
variety of individual petitions, when the connection described above
exists. A common example is collective redundancies caused by the
employer's organization, while a public sector example is legal actions
alleging violation of the rules on recruitment examinations brought by
171. See Lorenzo Zoppoli, Certificazione dei Contratti di Lavoro e Arbitrato: Le Liaisons
Dangereuses 24 (C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" IT, Working Paper No. 102, 2010);
Piergiovanni Alleva & Giovanni Naccari, "Legge Sacconi''.· un Fascio di lncostituzionalita, IL
MANIFESW (25 marzo 2010), http://www.dirittisocialiecittadinanza.org/Documenti/un%20fascio
%20di%20incostituzionalita.pdf; F. Scarpelli, Giurisdizione, Tutela dei Diritti, Arbitrato:
L'Ossessione def Legislatore di Centrodestra, Norn INFORMATIVE (I aprile 2010),
http://www.bollettinoadapt.it/old/files/document/6460SCARPELLl_GJURIS.pdf.
172. Cass. Pen., sez. VI, I luglio 2010, n.32525 (quoting a recent decision by the Supreme
Court that found an employer guilty of extortion when it required an employee to provide a
presigned letter of resignation as a condition of hiring); art. 629 Codice penale [C.p.] (It.)
(author's translation).
173. See Legge 24 dicembre 2007, n. 244, in G.U. 28 dicembre 2007, n. 300 (It.).
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the excluded candidates. But this is not a class action and the procedure
is identical to the ordinary procedure, be it one actor, five, or one
hundred.

B.

Learning from One Another

From an Italian perspective, it is difficult to answer the question of
what the Italian system could draw from the U.S. experience. The
resolution of employment disputes in the United States offers a variety of
methods that appear to respond mainly to practical needs. In the United
States, the authoritativeness of arbitration does not seem to be called into
question. This result has been accomplished primarily by the courts. In
contrast to Italy, the legislation relating to arbitration has not changed.
This does not imply, however, that workers and their lawyers do not
challenge individual arbitration agreements imposed when the worker is
in a state of maximum weakness, that is, at the time of hiring.
In the Italian civil law system, judges play a key role in turning the
"law in the books" into "law in action," with long and "creative"
explanations of the judgments. Paradoxically, excessive and lengthy
reasoning that explains the judgment has turned the judge from being the
mouth of the law to the subject who gives voice to the law, and becomes
master of the meaning of the rule of law.
The more interpretation defines the meaning of the rules, the more
crucial the role of the judge in identifying the authentic content of the
right in accordance with the rules defined by the case law. If one adds to
this the general perception--experienced especially since the l 970sthat the Italian courts in labor cases are biased in favor of the employees
because they are considered the weaker party to the relationship, it is
easy to understand why in Italy, where the employee has the right to
refuse arbitration, the use of arbitration is limited: usually employees
bring claims in Labor Court because they think they can count on a judge
who favors them.
For this reason, arbitration in Italy is used primarily in cases of high
asset value, occurring in legal relationships characterized by significant
economic exchanges. The parties in these relationships have a notable
lack of confidence in ordinary justice, deemed incapable of deciding the
interests at stake, both for cultural inadequacy and excessive bureaucracy.
The judge's role is crucial in American law as well, but that power
has been exercised to interpret the law to force employees into
arbitration. The United States could learn from the Italian system a
measure caution regarding protection of employee rights. While the
American courts are not considered proemployee, the American jury
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system provides a counterweight to the relatively proemployer orientation
of many courts. Conventional wisdom is that employees fare better in
front of juries because jurors relate to the "little guy" suing the big
employer. Studies show that employees in the United States generally
fare better in court than in arbitration on statutory claims such as
discrimination, and, in addition, many cases settle favorably to the
employee before trial. 174 Jurors also tend to award more damages to
employees than arbitrators in these cases. 115 Thus, it would seem that
given an informed choice, many U.S. employees, like Italian employees,
would choose to go to court rather than arbitrate claims based on
employment statutes.
Even in the Italian system, however, arbitration is utilized in cases
involving high asset value. Interestingly, the data on the American
system shows that higher paid employees fare better in arbitration on
their employment contract claims. 116 These employees are sufficiently
powerful to compel an employer to negotiate an employment contract
and thus, also likely to be able to hire an experienced lawyer to arbitrate
their claim. For these employees, as in Italy, a choice of arbitration may
be rational. For most other U.S. employees, however, employment
arbitration is not a choice and may require giving up statutory rights with
a reduced chance of prevailing on any claim. On the other side of the
equation, however, is the fact that many U.S. employees cannot find legal
representation for either litigation or arbitration. 177 This fact has
convinced some commentators to advocate an arbitral forum that is
easier for employees to navigate without legal representation. 118
Taking into account the Italian concern for employees' rights, the
United States might modify the employment arbitration system. There
are several possible options. Like Italy, arbitration could be a choice for
both parties to each dispute. Alternatively, U.S. law could make the
contractual choice for employment arbitration truly optional, refusing to
enforce agreements imposed as a condition of employment. This might
be accompanied by a requirement that the employer provide information
to enable employees to make an informed choice, such as details about
the system of arbitration and what the employee loses by foregoing
litigation for arbitration or vice versa. Another possibility would be for
174. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 79, at 378-90. As noted by Mahony & Wheeler,
however, caution must be used in assessing the studies, because all have limitations. Id
175. Id at 384-85.
176. Id at 379, 384.
177. Id at 382.
178. St. Antoine, supra note 76, at 91-93.
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the government to provide information to enable employees to make an
informed choice about arbitration. 119 A final option would be to impose
express and consistent legal standards on any arbitration system adopted
by employers to insure that the system is not unduly favorable to the
employer. Any of these options could be instituted by legislation.
Because of the current interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act,
however, legislation would have to be enacted at the federal level. 180
Given the infatuation of the U.S. courts with arbitration, the latter
might be the most palatable option. Many arbitration providers already
have standards, although they are not legally enforceable. 181 Employers
remain free to choose a provider with standards favorable to the
employer. Additionally, courts have imposed some standards under the
Federal Arbitration Act. 182 Existing standards vary by court, however, and
their unpredictability leads to litigation. Mandatory standards imposed
by legislation would insure some level of protection of employee rights
while still providing the alternative forum that the courts desire. Such a
result is unlikely, however, without a more active and effective lobbying
effort by advocates of employees and consumers.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Italian and American arbitration systems have evolved in the
context of the very different legal systems and cultures in the two
countries. As a result, it seems unlikely that the Italian system will draw
from the American system. Despite laws authorizing arbitration that is
less tethered to the law, the strong belief that the judicial system is the
best protector of employee rights limits its use except in cases of highlevel employees. The United States could learn from the Italian system a
heightened sensitivity to the protection of employee rights. If arbitration
were to be used in for individual employees, legislative protection that
insures that they are not deprived existing legal protections would
provide a more balanced system of dispute resolution. Given the current
I 79. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating
System To Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of
Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985, 994, l 069 (2012) (proposing a rating
system).
180. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act; 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 945-48 (1999) (discussing the broad preemptive
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court); AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1748-53 (201 l)(reiterating that approach).
181. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Federalization of Consumer Arbitration, 2013 U. CHI.
LEGAL FORUM 271, 290-91 (advocating implementation of reform by arbitration providers in
consumer arbitration).
182. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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power of business interests and the weakness of workers, however, this
changes seems unlikely.

